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Introduction
Marek Hanusch (this issue) takes exception to my empirical results (Potrafke 2012) which show that countries with Muslim majorities are less likely to be democratic. Actually, my study is one of many studies that come to the same conclusion: see Lipset (1994) ; Midlarsky (1998); Barro (1999) ; Karatnycky (2002); Fish (2002) ; Ross (2001 Ross ( , 2009 Ross ( , 2012 ; Donno and Russett (2004) ; Voigt (2005) ; Borooah and Paldam (2007) ; Rowley and Smith (2009); Facchini (2010) ; and Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) . Maseland and van Hoorn (2011: 483) propose, based on this literature, that "the fact that Muslim-majority countries tend to be significantly less democratic than other societies…is readily accepted".
My purpose was to determine whether that conclusion would change if a new measure of political institutions provided by Cheibub et al. (2010) were used. The Cheibub et al. (2010) measure has produced new conclusions from research investigating other interesting questions. 
Failure to understand the contribution of using new data
Hanusch has not understood that the contribution of my paper was to reevaluate past results using new data. He indicates in his paper that he believes my study to have been based on the widely used Polity IV dataset. He writes (Hanusch 2012: XXX; the emphasis is mine):
In fact, according to the Polity IV measure Potrafke uses to distinguish democracies from autocracies, only one country in the region, Israel, is democratic; and this country is not recognized by a number of other countries in the region.
Hanusch claims in his response to my paper to have used my data -but my dataset does not rely on the Polity IV index.
Exclude the State of Israel
Hanusch's manner of reference to the State of Israel in the statement quoted above and his treatment (or non-treatment) in the data of that nation are not readily understandable. Israel, as a non-Muslim democracy in a Muslim-dominated region, is a direct confirmation of the more general result that Hanusch seeks to deny, namely that Muslim-majority countries tend not to be democratic. It is not clear why Hanusch makes the point in the context of his comments that some Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East do not grant diplomatic recognition to Israel. The absence of diplomatic recognition by some Muslim-majority countries cannot change the fact that the State of Israel is a democracy in the non-democratic heartland of Islam. Hanusch excludes Israel from his dataset. There seems to be no objective reason for that exclusion.
Exclude the heartland of Islam
Hanusch also excludes countries in Islam's heartland. It is also not entirely clear why, in a study of the relation between Islam and democracy, data on Muslim-majority countries in the heartland of proposal that we delete data on the MENA region in a study concerned with the form of government in Muslim-majority countries is incomprehensible.
Oil and armed forces personnel
Hanusch claims that my results are subject to omitted variable bias because I did not properly control for oil production or income and ignored standing military forces or defense expenditures. He tells us that " Table 2 then presents the results for regressions that include the MENA region", but the specifications that Hanusch presents in Table 2 only have 167, 157 and 137 countries. Including his variables "Military", "Oil production", "Fuel exports" and "Commodity exports" -and assuming that the number of observations in Table 2 is correct -has again reduced the sample size. We are back with the issue of modifying the sample. Hanusch (2012: XXX) claims that:
Thus, essentially, the analysis underlying (Table A1 ).
Had Hanusch not inserted observations and replaced missing values by zeros, the sample sizes of his regressions in Table 2 would have been even smaller.
Independently of Hanusch not understanding the data I was using and independently of his selectivity in deciding which countries to include and which countries to exclude, and independently of the apparent problems with his dataset, we can still ask whether the influence of the Muslim variable vanishes when we control for oil production or income and armed forces personnel (again measured as a percentage of the total labor force). My previous specification included an oil exporter dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if exports of oil exceed 50% of total exports (Easterly and do not scale oil production by GDP but by population. The oil production to GDP ratio of two countries with similar oil production volumes differs when their GDPs differ and scaling by GDP is likely to give rise to endogeneity problems (see Ross 2012: 15f.) The advantage of using the EIA's oil production values rather Ross's oil and gas income (per capita) variable is that the former is available for 183 countries, whereas the latter is available for 169 countries. 6 The correlation coefficients between my per capita oil production values and, respectively, the oil income (per capita) variable and the oil and gas income (per capita) variable are 1.00 and 0.95. 7 Oil production values are averaged over the 1999-2008 period. The results in Table 2 show that including that variable does not change the result that the Muslim population share is statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of non-democratic government. Table 2 show that including armed forces personnel leaves unchanged the result that the Muslim population share is statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of non-democratic government.
An update
Regressing political institutions on a Muslim population share variable plus controls in a crosssectional model is admittedly a simple empirical strategy. The results could be sensitive to this strategy. 9 Hanusch does not challenge my paper in this respect. However, in the light of Hanusch's allegations, I present here some robustness checks.
Cross sectional data for the average over the period 1999-2008
In Potrafke (2012) oil production variable and the armed forces personnel data are not available for the entire sample, I
show results both including and excluding these variables.
10 Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates of the Tobit model. The coefficient of the Muslim share variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4), at the 5% level in columns (5) and (6) and at the 10% level in column (7). The log oil production variable and the log armed forces personnel variable have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Including the armed forces personnel variable reduces the sample size to 165 countries.
I have also estimated the model using OLS with robust standard errors. The Muslim share variable is statistically significant in every specification. The t-statistics of the Muslim share variable are somewhat larger than in the Tobit model.
When I use the more expansive democracy coding (type 2) by Cheibub et al. (2010) as the dependent variable and re-estimate the specification as in Table 2 , the Muslim share variable is statistically significant in columns (1) to (5) and lacks statistical significance in columns (6) and (7).
The specifications in columns (6) and (7) include 165 countries. Entering the armed forces personnel variable reduces the sample size and is likely to cause endogeneity problems. The more expansive democracy coding considers 41 countries to be democratic that are coded as dictatorships in the standard democracy measures. Examples include Algeria, Chad, Egypt, the Russian Federation, Tunisia, and Yemen. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all included variables.
11
10 I use logarithms of the oil production value and the armed forces personnel variable to better account for outliers and smooth the distributions of both variables. Inferences do not change when I enter the levels of the oil production value and the armed forces personnel instead of the logarithms. 11 Compared to my 2012 paper, I make four coding changes: For Oman, I used only the population share of Sunni Muslims, I now include the share of all Muslims. I did not consider the legal origin of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Germany and Saint Kitts and Nevis.
More recent data on Muslim population
To measure the Muslim share I have relied on the data of Alesina et al. (2003) . 
Causality
In my paper (Potrafke 2012), I made a purely empirical point in confirming that the well-established conclusion that countries with Muslim majorities are less likely to be democracies, is robust to using 
Conclusion
Hanusch has challenged the conclusion that countries with Muslim majorities are less likely to have democratic governments. He has not realized, though, that my objective was to reevaluate the results of past studies by using an alternative measure of democracy and he attributes to me a measure of democracy that I did not use. He reverses past results by selective exclusion of Muslim-majority countries in the heartland of Islam and also excluding the State of Israel, which is a non-Muslim 12 The absence of democracy impedes economic development because of the incentives of autocratic rulers to ensure that economic progress does not give rise to a viable opposition (Hillman, 2007a) . On Islam as an impediment to economic development, see Kuran (1997 , 2005 , 2011 ), Hillman (2007b , Kuran and Singh (2012), and Kuran and Lustig (2012) . Kuran (2011: 294) observes with respect to Islam that "the weaknesses of private sectors and civil societies, which are rooted in the region's institutional history, breed complacency toward autocratic rule". democracy in Islam's heartland. To generate his empirical estimates, Hanusch uses data that do not appear to exist or cannot be found in the data sources to which he refers. In the light of Hanusch's quest to reverse the past conclusions, I have rechecked and extended my empirical study and addressed issues he raised. After further empirical testing, the conclusion remains robust that Islam and democracy have tended to be incompatible. 
